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Implications of Watergate: Some Proposals
For Cutting the Presidency Down to Size t
BY ARTHUR SELWYN MILLER*

We should like to have good rulers, but historical experience shows
us that we are not likely to get them. This is why it is of such
importance to design institutions which will prevent even bad rulers
from causing too much damage.-KarlPopper

Introduction
Americans, as well as people throughout the world, have an extraordinary stake in the quality of their governmental institutions. All citizens share a concern that the competence and dependability of all
branches of government be achieved and secured insofar as it is possible to do so. There is a deep-seated appreciation of the necessity for
integrity in those occupying positions of governing power if American
government is -toregain and retain the confidence of the people. That
confidence has been badly shaken in recent years. The Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, although involved princi-

pally with the campaign of 1972, has a unique opportunity to re-evalut The following essay is a memorandum submitted to the Senate Select
Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities (the Watergate Committee) in early
1974. It was written in my capacity of Chief Consultant to the committee, and is
published here in order to give the profession an opportunity to read one of the
inputs to the committee. Readers may wish to compare it with the recommendations
made by the committee in its final report issued in July, 1974.
The memorandum is published as written, without the usual impedimenta of
footnotes. One addition has been made: The appendix sets out a brief argument on
the need for an alternative to impeachment as a means of removing chief executives;
this was not submitted to the committee. It is added to the memorandum as an
afterthought setting out a problem worth serious discussion.
* Professor of Law, National Law Center, George Washington University;
Chief Consultant, Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, 197374. Consultant, Senate Subcommittee on Separation of Powers, since 1970. The views
stated are those of the author and should not be attributed to the Watergate Committee
or its staff.
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ate ,the American political order and to suggest steps that may be taken
to help recover the people's trust in their governing institutions.
These are times that test -the mettle of a nation, the fiber of its
people, and the durability of its institutions. For almost 200 years
Americans have lived under a framework of government, conceived in
1787, and updated during the ensuing years, that save for one instance
-the Civil War-has enabled them to become the strongest and
wealthiest nation in history. One need not subscribe to Gladstone's fulsome praise to maintain that the men of 1787 saw clearly and built
truly. They constructed a polity that, for all its shortcomings, is sti~l
the last best hope of man. The strength and the worldwide influence
of the United States require that the nation take full advantage of its
position to build an even better domestic structure of government; and
the planet-wide responsibilities of the nation require that its institutions
be fully adapted to the perils and the opportunities of the human con-

dition.
Signs abound that the United States is now at a historic crossroads.
We have run out of space, the frontier having long since vanished; there
is no new earth ,to conquer. And we have run out of time, for social
problems, both domestic and foreign, press insistently for resolutions
that cannot be delayed.

The bases of American institutional power in

the past must be re-examined and, if necessary, redesigned to enable
us to meet the challenges of the day and-of equal importance-to anticipate those of tomorrow. Decisions and choices made now-within
the next few years-will of necessity guide the development of the future. Those decisions must be made, because even a failure to decide
will itself be a decision having significant consequences.
It is in that context that the Select Committee's work should be
seen; and it is against that background that the report was written. Its
focus far exceeds the "third-rate burglary" called Watergate, and even
the subsequent attempts to subvert the course of justice. It goes beyond improper campaign activities--"dirty tricks"--and even beyond
improper campaign financing. The committee1 considers that it is its
unavoidable, indeed its bounden duty to reassess the fabric of government in the context of "Watergate"--and within the terms of its obligations under Senate Resolution 60-as best as can one senatorial committee operating under pressure of time. Recommendations must be
made to the Senate that reasonably might be expected to remedy some
1. Although this article reads as though the Select Committee is speaking, no attribution should be made to it or it's staff. The memorandum was drafted in that form.
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of the ills directly uncovered by the committee's investigations and
hearings, or that may reasonably be implied therefrom.
We are aware that our activities have caught the attention, not
only of the American people, but of people throughout the world.
Consequently, we know that what is said in this report and what is recommended for congressional or other action will receive widespread
notice and study. In many respects the committee's hearings were an
invaluable seminar conducted through television and other media by
which the American people could learn about the nature of their government and profit from the disclosures of the hearings. Watergate
thus has provided an unparalleled opportunity-one not likely to be repeated-for a thorough re-examination of the American government.
The committee would be derelict if it failed to meet that challenge by
providing its considered judgment on present-day governmental institutions and mechanisms and recommending feasible alterations. That
opportunity will not soon come again.
In submitting this report to the Senate and to -the American people, the committee has had the benefit of advice and study by the National Academy of Public Administration, the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, the Association of the Bar of the City
of New York, the Lemberg Center for the Study of Violence at Brandeis University, the Center for the Public Financing of Elections, and
the Center for Governmental Responsibility. In addition, it has benefited from individual papers submitted to the committee staff from a
number of students of the constitutional order, as well as a conference
conducted under the auspices of the Center for the Study of Democratic
Institutions in Santa Barbara, California. These individual reports and
papers have all been carefully considered in drafting this report. All
statements and recommendations made herein, however, are solely
those of the committee; they should not be attributed to any of the
named organizations or any of -the individuals who gave so freely of
their time to aid the committee. That their work was done at no cost
to the committee is testimony to the deep interest that Americans everywhere have in Watergate and to the sense of responsibility many
have to assist in rectifying shortcomings disclosed in the hearings.
If nothing else, Watergate and accompanying events demonstrate
how very far this nation falls short of realization of the ideal of the rule
of law. Central to a polity created on "republican" principles but
which has moved haltingly but steadily toward a more "democratic" society, the rule of law has been flouted repeatedly for many years. We
have strayed far from the principle that those who wield governing
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power should be limited by those external standards of judgment that
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes called law. The culmination came in
Watergate, a concatenation of "horrors" that has shaken the faith of
the nation and contributed greatly to deepening cynicism about the
process of government.
In one sense, Watergate was an accident. Were it not for a vigilant guard who found a door (inexplicably) taped open, an unmarked
police car that failed to alert the look-out for the Watergate burglars,
two young, enterprising reporters for the Washington Post who assiduously and alone pursued the story for months, a forthright federal judge
who perceived inadequacies in the investigation and prosecution of the
Watergate burglars, and this committee, the word "Watergate" would
not now evoke recollections of "Teapot Dome" and other major scandals in American history. The chairman of the Select Committee remarked during the hearings that in his judgment Watergate was a tragedy for the American people exceeded only by the Civil War. Tragedy it may be, in that it has contributed to the growing cynicism about
our governing institutions and elected officials, but accident it surely
was. Only by that series of listed fortuities, which in retrospect seem
well-nigh incredible, did Watergate burst forth to sear the conscience
of the nation. This report has been written with the clear recognition
that steps must be taken to prevent future Watergates (in all their ramifications); no reliance should be placed on the accident of discoveries.
Our institutions must be sufficient to the need-to "prevent even bad
rulers from causing too much damage."
Summary of Hearings
On February 7, 1973, the Senate voted 77-0 to create a bipartisan
investigative committee from its membership for the purpose of thoroughly inquiring into Watergate, and all the events before and after
which that word came to symbolize. Almost eight months had passed
since the day five burglars were arrested inside the Democratic National Committee Headquarters in the Watergate building. During that
time, only one attempt had been made for the Senate to take responsibility to determine whether illegal and unethical activities had occurred during the presidential campaign of 1972. Senate Resolution
353, which would have established a commission composed of former
Senator John Williams and former Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg to investigate the Watergate incident and attendant events, particularly in connection with the possible misuse of campaign funds, was
not acted on. (An effort in the House of Representatives by the House
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Banking and Currency Committee to conduct hearings before the November elections in 1972 was effectively thwarted by the committee's
own membership.)
The seven Watergate defendants were all convicted in early 1973.
On February 5, 1973, Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. introduced Senate Resolution 60. Two days later the Senate voted unanimously to establish
the committee to "conduct an investigation and study of the extent, if
any, to which illegal, improper or unethical activities were engaged in
by any persons acting individually or in combination with others in the
presidential election of 1972, or any campaign canvass, or other activity
related to it." Mandated with broad investigative responsibility and
armed with the subpoena power, the committee of four Democrats and
three Republicans named Samuel Dash as Chief Counsel and Staff Director, and had assembled a core staff by mid-March. The committee,
under the chairmanship of Senator Ervin and with Senator Howard H.
Baker, Jr. as vice-chairman, thus was operative when on March 23,
1973, convicted Watergate burglar James W. McCord wrote Judge
John J. Sirica charging that perjury and obstruction of justice had been
involved in the indictment and conviction of the five men originally apprehended in the burglary and the attendant conspiracy.
McCord's letter broke the wall of silence that had surrounded Waitergate. It was directly instrumental in the manner in which the committee proceeded in its investigations and public hearings. Principle
emphasis was to be on the Watergate burglary, its planning and subsequent coverup. Other areas, of equal importance but of somewhat
lesser prominence in the public eye, were campaign espionage and sabotage, colloquially known as "dirty tricks," and campaign financing.
The committee staff, divided two-thirds for the majority members and
one-third for the minority, was divided into those -three areas.2 The
teams of attorneys, investigators and researchers were augmented by
expert consultants and a clerical staff. For the first time in congressional history, a computer system (at the Library of Congress) was employed for information storage and retrieval. The persistent question,
with respect to the Watergate burglary, was: Who knew what and why
did it happen? Ultimately, that question became: How much did the
Presidentknow?
Amwers were forthcoming when public hearings began on May
2. Fred Thompson was named chief counsel for the minority; James Hamilton,
Terry Lenzner, and David Dorsen were selected as assistant chief counsels for the
majority. Rufus Edmisten became deputy chief counsel.
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17, 1973. Those hearings continued until November, 1973 and ceased
in early 1974 only because the actions of grand juries and the Judiciary
Committee of the House of Representatives made further public disclosures by the committee unnecessary. In all, sixty-three witnesses

were heard in public session; their testimony is recorded in thirteen volumes.
During the Watergate phase of the public hearings, the committee

deliberately proceeded slowly so as to build a solid foundation.

This

was accomplished by analyzing the organizational structure of both the
White House and the Committee for the Re-election of the President
(CREP). Witnesses provided a framework not only for discerning the
method in which these organizations operated but also for the burglary
itself.' The testimony of Mr. Dean, and the subsequent revelation by
Mr. Butterfield of secret recordings of oval office conversations,
brought -the name of the president, and his possible complicity, into full
scrutiny. The insistent questions became: What did the president
know and when did he know it?
Hearings were resumed on September 24, 1973. The final wit3. They were:
Robert C. Odle, Jr., office manager of CREP; Bruce A. Kehrli, special assistant to the president; Paul W- Leeper, sergeant, Metropolitan Police Department, Washington, D.C. (one of the arresting officers); John Bruce Barrett,
another arresting officer of the Washington Police Department: Carl M. Schofler, a third arresting officer; James W. McCord, Jr., former assistant to Mr.
Odle (and the person who "blew the whistle" by writing to Judge Sirica);
John J. Caulfield, assistant director for Criminal Enforcement, Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms of the Department of the Treasury; Anthony
Ulasewicz, retired New York City Police Department detective; Gerald Alch,
former attorney for Mr. McCord; Bernard L. Barker, convicted Watergate
burglar; Alfred C. Baldwin, 3U, the "lookout" in the Watergate burglary;
Sally Harmony, former secretary to G. Gordon Liddy, counsl to CREP and
the FCRP (Liddy was a convicted conspirator in the Watergate burglary);
Robert A. Reisner, former administrative assistant to Jeb. S. Magruder; Hugh
W. Sloan, Jr., former treasurer of FCRP; Herbert L. Porter, former director of
scheduling for CREP.
They were followed by:
Maurice H. Stans, former secretary of commerce and chairman of FCRP; Jeb
S. Magruder, former deputy campaign director for CREP; John W. Dean, H,
former counsel to the president; John N. Mitchell, former attorney general
and campaign director of CREP; Richard A. Moore, special counsel to the
president; Alexander P. Butterfield, administrator of the Federal Aviation
Agency and former assistant to H.R. Halderman; Herbert W. Kalmbach,
former associate finance chairman for FCRP and personal attorney to the
president; Robert C. Mardian, former counsel to CREP; Gordon Strachan,
former staff assistant to H.R. Haldeman; John Ehrlichman, former chief domestic advisor to the president; H.R. Haldeman, former assistant to the president; Richard Helms, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency and
now American ambassador to Iran; Robert C. Cushman, Jr., Commandant,
Marine Corps and former deputy director of the CIA; Vernon A. Walters,
deputy director of the CIA; Patrick Gray, former acting director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation; Richard G. Kleindienst, former attorney
general; and Henry E. Petersen, assistant attorney general, criminal division.
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ness in the first (Watergate) phase was E. Howard Hunt, a former CIA

agent and former consultant to the White House, who was in prison
as a convicted Watergate conspirator.
"Dirty Tricks"

The committee then began hearings on "dirty tricks" in the presidential campaign of 1972, that being the colloquialism -applied to cam-

paign espionage and sabotage. In addition to the facts of what occurred in 1972, the committee attempted to determine the line between permissible "pranks" and overt acts of stealing and forging documents and other interferences with an opponent's strategies. It became obvious that it is difficult indeed to draw the line between what
is proper and ethical and what is not, and between practical but clean
politics and "dirty politics". 4
Campaign Financing
The final phase of public hearings centered on campaign financing, primarily upon illegal corporate contributions and the circumstances under which -they were given. The misuse of political influence
in the granting of program funds and federal jobs in return for political
contributions was also investigated. 5
4. The following witnesses testified on political activities:
Patrick J. Buchanan, special consultant to the president; Donald H. Segretti,
former employee of CREP; Martin D. Kelly, employed by Mr. Segretti; John
R. Buckley, former director of Inspection Division, Office of Economic Opportunity; Michael W. McMinoway, employed by CREP; Frederick J. Taugher,
former coordinator of the southern California campaign for Senator McGovern; Gary Hickman, lieutenant, Los Angeles Police Department; Richard
G. Stearns, former western region campaign director for Senator McGovern;
Frank Mankiewicz, former political director for Senator McGovern; Marc
Lackritz, SCOPCA staff; Berl Bernhard, former campaign manager for Senator
Muskie; Clark Macgregor, former director of CREP; Truman F. Campbell,
chairman of the Republican Central Committee of Fresno County, California;
Michael Heller, student at Mt. Hood Community College, Gresham, Oregon;
Paul Brindze, student at the University of California at Los Angeles; Tim Lee
Carter, member of Congress for the fifth district of Kentucky, delegate to the
1972 Republican National Convention and member of the platform Committee; and Jeremiah P. Sullivan, police superintendent, Boston, Massachusetts.
5. Testimony was heard from the following eleven witnesses, beginning on November 7 and ending on November 15:
William H. Marumoto, a former White House employee; John J. Priestes,
building contractor from Coral Gables, Florida; Benjamin Fernandez, former
organizer of the National Hispanic Finance Committee for the Re-election of
the President; Matthew E. Clark, Jr., director of purchasing for the American
Shipbuilding Co.; Robert Bartlome, secretary of the American Shipbulding
Co.; Orin E. Atkins, chairman of the board, Ashland Oil, Inc.; Claude C.
Wilde, Jr., vice president of Gulf Oil Corp.; Camlli Fabrega, regional vicepresident for Braniff Airways; Neal Robinson, assistant treasurer of Braniff
Airways; George A. Spater, former chairman and chief executive officer of
American Airlines; and Russell DeYoung, chairman of the board and chief
executive officer of Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co.
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Parallel Activities
TangentialInvestigations
The three major segments of the committee's investigations unavoidably led into a number of peripheral investigations which, because
of time limitations, did not get aired publicly. These investigations,
not aired in a public forum because of the rapid flow of events which
moved the centers for action into -the courts and the House Judiciary
Committee, dealt mainly with "dirty tricks", campaign financing and
possible CIA involvement. Investigations continued after hearings
ceased, ending in March, 1974. The results of those investigations are
published in the hearings.
Litigation
Almost continuously since it began its public hearings, the committee was involved in a series of lawsuits. The first was the attempt
in June, 1973 by the special prosecutor, Archibald Cox, to have the
committee's hearings postponed until after the grand jury's work had
been completed. That effort by Mr. Cox failed.
The disolosure by Mr. Butterfield on July 16, 1973, that the president had recorded conversations in the oval office, his Executive Office
Building office, and several telephones led to an attempt to get the recordings through a written request. When that was rejected by the
president, two subpoenas were issued to the president for the tape recordings and for certain White House documents. That historically unprecedented action (subpoenaing the president) triggered litigation
that continues at the time of writing this report. The committee voted
in open session to sue in federal district court in Washington to get the
tapes. At about the same time the special prosecutor also subpoenaed
some tape recordings.
Mr. Cox's move to enforce grand jury subpoenas was decided by
Judge John J. Sirica in favor of the special prosecutor, whereupon the
president appealed. Judge Sirica was upheld by the court of appeals,
after which several tapes (two were missing) were produced for -the
special prosecutor.
Unlike Mr. Cox's case, which was based on the federal rules of
criminal procedure and which did not involve separation of powers
problems, the committee's suit had to be brought under the federal
rules of civil procedure. After hearing oral argument on the commit.tee's motion for summary judgment, on October 14, Judge Sirica held
that his court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the suit. That decision
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was appealed by the committee, and the appeal was accompanied by
action in the Senate (and later the House) to enact a special bill giving
the district court jurisdiction to enforce committee subpoenas. S. 2641
became law on December 17, 1973.
Subsequent motions by committee lawyers to enforce the two subpoenas ,led to a decision on February 8, 1974, by Judge Gerhard Gesell
to dismiss the suit. That decision was upheld by the court of appeals
in May, 1974.
Other Activities
Beginning in May, 1973, members of the committee staff solicited
comment from approximately 150 students of the political and constitutional order on the larger implications of the committee's investigations. In addition, several organizations were asked to furnish the committee with their evaluation of: (a) the key issues or questions brought
out by the committee and (b) alternatives of action that the committee
might consider in writing its report. Thoughtful statements were received from a number of individual scholars. Of particular help were
studies produced by the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research and the National Academy of Public Administration.
While the outside input has proved to be of great help to the committee in completing its work, the committee at all times reserved judgment about individual suggestions and points of view. This aspect of
the committee work was accomplished at no cost to the taxpayer; the
members of the Select Committee wish to express their gratitude to
the organizations and individuals who gave so freely and selflessly of
their time, and also to the.Ford Foundation which helped to defray the
expenses of the American Enterprise Institute and of the National
Academy of Public Administration (the latter organization was also financially aided by a grant from the John D. Rockefeller III Fund, for
which the committee is grateful).
Summary
The intense public interest in -the activities of the Select Committee was evidenced by the more than 240 news representatives who appeared to cover the public sessions and the nation-wide television and
radio coverage given the hearings. That the interest in Watergate was
not limited only to the United States was shown by the number of reporters from European and other countries who covered the hearings,
as well as by the time given on radio and television in such countries
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as Canada, the United Kingdom, West Germany, and the Netherlands.
All in all, then, it is fair to say that the hearings were an informal seminar that has proved to be an extraordinarily valuable educational vehicle in the inner operations of the American government, with special
ordinarily valuable educational vehicle. Immeasurable though they
may be, the educational benefits are among the most important aspects
of the committee's work, Never before in American history have the
day-to-day operations of the most powerful governmental office in the
world been held up to such intense public scrutiny.
One consequence is to be deplored: the weakening of the confidence of the American people in the people and the institutions who
govern them. That is both one of the prices that unavoidably had to
be paid for exposing the cancer known as Watergate that had grown
upon -the governmental structure and a challenge to this committee to
produce recommendations -that are at once desirable and feasible for
remedying Watergate and helping to regain public confidence.
That challenge is the subject of this memorandum. First, however, it is desirable to set the problem in some perspective.
The Context of Watergate
To place Watergate and attendant matters in proper perspective,
it is desirable to discuss briefly th esocial, political, and historical context
in which the episode arose. An initial inquiry is into the question of
whether Watergate is to be seen as an aberration or as a culmination
of historical developments. The committee did not study the question
in depth, but enough data are available in the public record to be able
to make some preliminary conclusions. This is necessary because if
Watergate is considered to be unique and not likely to be repeated in
the future, then only a set of relatively minor committee recommendations are necessary. On the other hand, if it is considered the culmination or extension of known historical trends that reached a peak and
a temporary cessation in Watergate but which may well be repeated
in other forms by future governmental leaders, then other, more extensive recommendations are required.
The deviations from proper behavior disclosed by the committee's
hearings (and other events) must be regardid as both aberrational and
an extension of trends that have been evident for many years. Seen
as aberration, Watergate may be perceived as the result of bringing into
positions of immense governmental power individuals whose basic loyalties ran to the leader (the president) rather than to the people or
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to law. Enough 'guilty pleas of those individuals have already been received to buttress that conclusion. Ideological loyalty was the overriding concern.
At the same time, Watergate evidences defects in the system itself. There are enough data on the public record to suggest that some,
even most, of the improper practices have been growing gradually for
several decades (some, indeed, run back to the very beginnings of -the
republic). Among these trends are: excessive secrecy (including use
of executive privilege); reliance on "national security" as an excuse for
extraconstitutional action; use of the public administration to reward
friends and punish opponents ("enemies"); -the politicization of the
governmental service, particularly the Department of Justice; seeking
political contributions from private interests with implicit (or explicit)
assurances of support or favor (or the absence of disfavor); and "dirty
tricks" generally.
Thus seen, Watergate, far from being an isolated incident that can
be treated as a discrete criminal law matter, requires that attention be
devoted to the very system itself in order to determine where and how
it may be improved.
This is not to say that the "system" is not working at the present
time. Indeed it is. The activities of the Select Committee, the action
of the House Committee on the Judiciary, the work of the special prosecutor's office, actions by the courts-all these, and more, show that
once "Watergate" had been exposed, the system was adequate to the
immediate need of dealing with the derelictions of that burglary and
attendant events. Exposure of Watergate may well have been an accident, as was said 'above, but from the accumulated testimony heard by
the Select Committee, plus other matters on public record, it is obvious
that sooner or later something would have occurred to indicate what
was taking place within government. So the paradox remains: the
"system" is working, but it needs improvement.
There are, furthermore, certain historical trends outside of Watergate that must be taken into consideration in any evaluation of it and
in making recommendations. Included are:
1. The fundamental change in the nature of government that has
occurred over the past four decades. The change has taken place,
without constitutional amendment, by legislation validated by the Supreme Court 'and by custom 'and usage (mainly the extra-constitutional
exercise of power by the executive).
The net result is the rise of the "administrative state," a govern-
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ment which has assumed obligations toward the body politic that far
exceed any prior to 1933.
The Constitution has become one of (affirmative) powers as
much or more than one of (negative) limitations-which was the theory prior to the 1930's.
Within the structure of modem government, the following factors
are noteworthy:
-Decline of the states
-Decline of the congress
-Aggrandizement of executive power
-Rise of political parties (an extra-constitutional development)
so as to make them part of the governing process.
2. The "administrativestate" is the "interventionist"state. Government has assumed the obligation of furthering the economic wellbeing of the American people (the basic statute is the Employment Act
of 1946); this is a commitment to enhance the "quantity of American
life."
At the same time, government has assumed obligations under the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 to further the "quality of
life."
That these goals may be, and often 'are, in conflict does not gainsay the fact that government is deeply immersed in all aspects of American life. These types of intervention into socio-economic matters have
been legitimized by a series of Supreme Court decisions, particularly
inthe post-1937 period.
3. The United States has planet-wide interests. "Watergate" is
not a peculiarly American problem. People everywhere have an interest in the nature of the United States government. All the world is
dependent upon the trustworthiness of the American president.
Furthermore, the interdependence of world problems, highlighted
by -the energy crisis, requires that serious attention be accorded to the
expectations of other nations.
4. The task of government is to take an active and influential
part in the management and allocation of a finite amount of resources.
The view that resources are finite, and perhaps will soon not be available, is something new for this country.
5. The movement toward equality. Long recognized, at least as
far back as de'Tocqueville, -the equality drive encompasses both status
and wealth. Furthermore, it 'has both a domestic and a foreign dimen-
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sion-the latter in the demands being made by the third world.
6. The need for presidential leadership. There can be no dispute that modern government in this country, as well as elsewhere,
must be based on a strong executive. The tasks of government outlined above simply require that Congress, at best, can set general
guidelines, with the chief executive exercising considerable discretion
over the administration of public policies. At the same time, some better means of checking the executive must be found.
7. The fundamental problem. How to make power that is necessary to carry out the assumed obligations of government as decent
and tolerable-as "accountable"--as possible. Wherever governmental power is exercised, it is necessary (a) to cabin it within reasonable limits and (b) to permit it to accomplish its urgent tasks. This
can only be done by perceiving the actual-in Bryce's term, the "practical"-Constitution and to distinguish it from the formal.
The Constitution of 1787 separated governmental powers both to
prevent despotism and to promote efficiency. Almost nineteen decades later, the historical separation has been warped by an aggrandizement of power in the executive with a consequent diminution of legislative power. In many respects, Watergate evidences the imbalances
that have resulted from that fundamental change in the "practicar'
Constitution. It is the -task of this committee to attempt to rectify the
shortcomings of that development, without at the same time weakening
the manner in which our governmental institutions may act and react
to the problems and crises of the age.
Recommendations
Watergate has demonstrated to even the most casual observer that
the constitutional system in some respects is badly awry. A troubling
amount of power has become concentrated in the presidency. Developments throughout our history have led to that aggrandizement of
powers. A consequence is a substantially weakened Congress.
It is not that the president acquired his added powers without good
reasons-or, for that matter, without the acquiescence of the Congress.
All too often, Congress has been quick to delegate large amounts of
governing power to the chief executive and to the public administration
generally. Other powers have come to the president through "constitutional adverse possession," by movements to fill vacuums in governing
authority.
Simultaneously-particularly during the past three decades-the
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position of the executive offices of the presidency has greatly increased.
White House staffs have swollen to proportions far in excess of anything
in the past. A consequence is the reduction of the independent powers
of cabinet members and of the heads of other agencies. The movement has been toward centralized control over the entire executive
branch.
This development within the "practical" Constitution clearly suggests a need for a re-examination of the basic premises of the separation of powers doctrine.
To Madison, the doctrine of separation of powers was the "sacred
maxim of free government," designed to guard against concentration
of the power of governance in -the same hands--"the very definition
of tyranny." That view has had general acceptance since Madison
wrote Federalist No. 47; echoed, for example, by Justice Brandeis in
the Myers case and shortly thereafter by Justice Sutherland. It is the
core of Justice Black's opinion for the Supreme Court in the Steel Seizure Case and has been repeated for different reasons by both congressional committees (principally the Senate's Subcommittee on Separation of Powers) and 'by President Nixon's attorneys in the cases
brought by Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox and the Select Committee
to enforce subpoenas against the president.
That ancient doctrine must now be reassessed in the light of its
history and in the context of the demands made upon government in
the modem era. A word is in order, first, about the term itself: (a)
it is not a "doctrine" but a theory; in other words, it provides a framework for analysis rather than a set of interdictory rules; and (b) it is
a misnomer, for "powers" are not actually "separated" by the American
Constitution; that instrument establishes separate institutions sharing
power-a quite another and, indeed, a fundamental distinction.
Nevertheless, the familiar term is used as shorthand for a fairly
complicated and, oddly, given -the legalistic bent in this country, a toolittle analyzed principle. The net conclusion is multiple, stated briefly
here: separation of powers was developed for reasons in addition to
the protection against tyranny; cooperation, not conflict, has been the
norm of interaction between the branches; there have been major realignments of actual power within the framework of government created in 1787; and the need is becoming acute for radical surgery if
the goals of the doctrine are to be attained.
Those who take a fiio-pietistic view of the framers of the Constitution may believe that the political (that is, constitutional) theory of
separation of powers was invented by the fifty-five men who sat in Phil-
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adelphia that hot summer of 1787 or by their alleged intellectual mentor, Charles Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu. But that is not true.
It bears some resemblance to, but is not the same as, the "mixed constitution" well known to the ancient Greeks. Prominent in Plato's Laws
and Aristotle's Politics, the theory of the mixed constitution was perhaps most clearly enunciated by Polybius, -the Greek historian whose
mixture of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy had its greatest influence in Rome. Not until the late middle ages did separation of
powers appear in the literature in anything like its modem form. But
there is obvious overlap between the two theories. Both are concerned
with achieving liberty under law; both are based on a conception that
concentration of power means tyranny; and both appear to be predicated on a view of mankind as essentially irrational. "The theme of
man's irrationality" during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
Arthur 0. Lovejoy maintained, "and especially of his inner corruption
was no longer a specialty of divines; it became for a time one of the
favorite topics of secular literature."
Political theorists, European and American, thus came to emphasize the dangers rather -than the advantages of government. If man
was depraved and -antisocial, he -then required control; but those who
controlled, themselves human beings, would mercilessly exploit their
subjects unless there were some way to limit their power. Lord Acton's famous aphorism about the corrupting aspects of power simply
restated some familiar learning of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. As Madison put it:
But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several
powers in -the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and
personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. The provision for defense must in -this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to -the danger of attack. It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the
abuses of government. But what is government itself, but -the
greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels,
no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men,
neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by
men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place
oblige it to control itself.
Madison, however, saw matters somewhat differently from other
prominent framers of the Constitution. Efficiency was stressed as a
principal reason for establishing an executive independent from the
legislature by, among others, Johni Adams , Thomas Jefferson, John Jay,
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and James Wilson. Jefferson clearly perceived that the absence of a
division of governmental powers resulted in ineffectual executive action. He was as much or more concerned about the harm resulting
from legislative dominance over the executive as he was about possible harm that might occur to Americans' liberties. James Wilson's
views are particularly apposite:
In planning, forming, and arranging laws deliberation is always becoming, and always useful. But in the active scenes of government, there are emergencies, in which the man, as, in other cases,
the woman, who deliberates, is lost. But, can either secrecy or dispatch be expected when, to every enterprise, mutual communication, mutual consultation, and mutual agreement among men, perhaps of discordant views, of discordant tempers and of discordant
interests, are indispensably necessary? How much time will be
consumed! and when it is consumed; how little business will be
done! . . . If, on the other hand, the executive power of government is placed in the hands of one person, is there not reason to
expect, in his plans and conduct, promptitude, activity, firmness,
consistency, and energy?
Under the Articles of Confederation, government was seriously
faulty because powers were not separated, which resulted in ineffectual
governmental activity.
The two conceptions, quite obviously, are not consistent, either in
philosophy or in application. As noted, the orthodox notion is based
on a conception of man as essentially so evil in nature that he is likely
to use governmental power contrary to the common interest unless institutionaliy prevented from doing so. On the other hand, the efficiency version appears to be predicated on a view, set out, for example,
by Carl Becker in The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century Philosophers, that man is not naturally depraved and that he "is capable,
guided solely by the light of reason and experience, of perfecting the
good life on earth." Both versions have had currency throughout
American history, one as official doctrine, the other as actual practice.
Despite assertions to the contrary, the efficiency version has been
dominant throughout American constitutional history. Separation of
powers has never been a barrier to a -high level of cooperation between
the political branches of government-a situation that, speaking generally, has found judicial acceptance-illustrated, for example, by the
lonely examples of the only two cases in which the Supreme Court ever
struck down delegations of legislative power to federal agencies and
by the Steel Seizure Case, the most important instance of judicial disapproval of executive action. As Willard Hurst has shown, both the
federal and state governments, aided by the judiciaries, cooperated in
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the exploitation of the virgin continent during the nineteenth century.
In this century, the closing of the frontier has not altered the posture
of cooperation. Woodrow Wilson put it well in 1908, when he stated
in his classic Constitutional Government that "warfare" between the
branches could be "fatal" to the constitutional order.
The norm of cooperation is too little recognized in the legal profession and among commentators, who tend to emphasize conflict
rather than cooperation. Just as in law the Holmesian notion of the
"bad man" tends 'to dominate rather than H.L.A. Hart's "good man!
theory, so too in our study of the American Constitution there is a
tendency to look for the tensions and disputes. We tend, also, to engage in what Franz Neumann called "constitutional fetishism"-the attribution of political consequences, such as individualism and personal
liberty, "to isolated constitutional arrangements which have meaning
only in a total cultural, and particularly social, setting."
Cooperation as the norm could scarcely be otherwise. If government is to function, there must be at least a tacit agreement, if not
express recognition, among the leaders of all the departments that their
duty is to keep the ship of state on its way and not permit it to get
bogged down in the mud of continuous controversy. This is not to say
that government accomplishes its tasks well or effectively; the contrary
all too often is true. But it is -to say that insofar as government functions are concerned, separated powers are not now, and never were,
a barrier of any consequence to getting necessary social results accomplished. Neumann puts it somewhat differently: "The (classical) liberal state, supposedly condemned to play the role of the night watchman, was exactly as strong as it needed to be in order to fulfill its
domestic and foreign political tasks." To state it in still another way,
social and political change-what some call progress-can come about
only by moves in concert by the three branches. That there has been
massive change in the actual allocation of powers within the national
government is, of course, wholly truistic. Constitutional change dt the
level of effective control over public policy has resulted from agreement, tacit or express, among the three powers.
Within the United States, the allocation of formal constitutional
powers has remained the same since 1787. The few amendments that
have been added do nothing to alter the historical structure. But as
Woodrow Wilson said, "The Constitution is in operation manifestly a
very different thing from the Constitution of the books." It is, accordingly, a task of those who discuss the nature of the constitutional order
to delve below the facade and determine the reality beneath it, not al-
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lowing themselves to be confused by reference to any supposed intention of the framers of the fundamental law.
Plumb beneath the surface of constitutional formalism and one
soon finds at least two bedrock principles: (a) political institutions
may 'be outwardly balanced but social forces normally are not; and (b)
the ostensible balance of political power hides the steady accretion of
power in the executive. The first principle requires no present exposition.
There is an apparently irreversible alteration of American government toward executive hegemony. No serious observer disputes
the rise of presidential government, however much he may decry it and
illustrate its potential for danger. It is enough to underscore the point
that the change in fact, as opposed to fundamentalist constitutional
theory, came about by the ready and long-continued acquiesence of
Congress, accompanied by the Supreme Court's well-nigh complete refusal or inability to stay the course of constitutional change. The net
result has been, in the words of Amaury de Riencourt. that the president today "wears ten hats-as Head of State, Chief Executive, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chief Legislator, Head of the Party, Tribune
of the People, Ultimate Arbiter of Social Justice, Guardian of Economic
Prosperity, and World Leader of Western Civilization." To that might
be added that the president is also the Chief Law Enforcer, a power,
as recent events have demonstrated, that is itself of considerable import. Those eleven hats, balanced somewhat precariously on the head
of one man, have had the concomitant result of an exponential expansion of the E.O.P.-the Executive Offices of the President. The culmination of 'almost 200 years of constitutional history is a swollen presidency-both in its personal sense of the monarchical character of the
chief executive and its institutional sense of the several thousand bureaucrats, high and low, who man the E.O.P.
The analog of aggrandized presidential power is. of course, diminished legislative and judicial. powers. (And also, be it said, of the
powers of the several states-but that is q separate problem.) A
strong presidency, as it has .evolved, means a sapless Congress and a
judiciary, so far as the actual control of governance is concerned, whose
powers are more ostensible than real. However one views the executive, then, whether as chief executive sitting atop the pinnacle of the
public administration or as a set of feudalities in a far from monolithic
structure, there can be no dispute over the answer to the question of
where most of the power of governance lies in the tripartite system.
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Why -this development has occurred is not susceptible of easy answer. Certainly it has not been because of conspiracy to take over government -by a sort of silent and continuing coup d'etat. Neither has
it been caused by the Supreme Court (although some scholars who
should know better attribute an extremely high degree of power to that
tribunal) nor by Congress, save by legislative acts that have delegated
enormous chunks of governing power to the bureaucracy and by legislative inaction. Congress has by and large remained silent while the
reality beneath the constitutional facade altered. Change has been a
primary characteristic of the Constitution of 1787; but as Ernest Nagel
has shown, there is no simple and at the same time adequate explanation of any social phenomenon, including the fact of constitutional
change.
Surely the causes are multiple. It is too simplistic, perhaps, for
Neumann to assert that "the higher the state of technological development, the greater the concentration of political power," a sentiment
that finds a counterpart in Galbraith's statement that it is "technological
imperatives" that demand the giant business corporation. But there
may be at least a kernel of truth in the proposition. The scientifictechnological revolution has paralleled the rise of presidential government. The causal relationship between the two is terra incognita in
constitutional theory. Technological determinism bears at least a faint
resemblance to Max Weber's famous hypothesis about the relationship
between Protestantism and the rise of capitalism. As a hypothesis,
rather than as dogma, there is little to quarrel about in Weber's formulation. The same may be said for Neumann's. In sum, as Frederick
Jackson Turner put it, "Behind institutions, behind constitutional forms
and modifications, lie the vital forces that call these organs into life and
shape them to meet changing conditions." Among those vital forces
must be listed the new technology.
With that indisputable state of affairs as background, it is a necessary implication from the committee's hearings (and other activities)
that there is no effective instrument to impose accountability upon the
swollen presidency. The historical system of checks and balances has
proved to be at least partially inadequate. Something new is needed,
something that will include measures that at once will permit presidential leadership in government and provide some accountability of that
leadership (and power) short of the quadrennial ballot and the blunderbuss of impeachment. It is with that pressing requirement in
mind that the following recommendations are made, not with the idea
that -they exhaust all of the possibilities for action, but rather with the
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hope that they will provide a framework for thought and action about
rectifying some of the manifest shortcomings in our governmental
structure.
Recommendation No. I
The Congress should take appropriate action to clarify the meaning of
"national security", establish its legitimate uses, and promulgate guidelines for its future application.
Discussion: The term "national security" has become an all-encompassing justification for a variety of government actions, particularly
by the executive. The committee heard testimony in which the burglary of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office was predicated on an undefined concept of national security. Such an episode clearly indicates
the pressing need for clarification of the meaning to this concept and
establishment of guidelines for its use.
Although not unique to the Nixon administration, the use of national security to justify actions is of relatively recent origin. It was
seldom employed before the advent of the cold war. It is at best an
ambiguous term, one that permits the widest discretion in those who
invoke it as a justification for taking certain actions. Indeed, to the
knowledge of this committee, it has never been defined by any governmental body. At issue, furthermore, is the scope of its permissible use
and by whom the decision on national security are to be made. This
recommendation addresses each of these problems.
First, as to who may decide national security issues: the committee is firmly of the opinion that Congress must assert its constitutional
duty (as compared with lawful authority) to participate in making national security decisions. It can best do that by clarifying the meaning
of the term and enacting standards as -to when it may be used. Ultimately, the decisions on national security, insofar as detail is concerned,
are executive in nature. (With respeot to the national security apparatus-including such organizations as the Central Intelligence Agency,
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the National Security Council, and
the National Intelligence Advisory Board, as well as the departments
of Defense and State-most or all of these have been drawn in one
way or another into the Watergate net. See Recommendation No. 2).
In the name of "national security," what is acceptable governmental (including executive) behavior and what is not? What is legitimate and what is not? Do different rules or norms apply in the conduct of external affairs as compared with domestic matters? Before
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attempting to suggest some ways of analyzing those difficult questions,
it is desirable to develop the nature of the problem.
A former assistant to Henry Kissinger recently stated:
Only a tiny minority of true believers remains to be persuaded that
Watergate represents anything other than a serious disease in our
body politic. We can and do take considerable comfort in the fact
that the 'system'-by which we refer to the persistent and frequently courageous activities of the press, the judiciary, some parts
of the executive, and, to a lesser degree, the legislature--has shown
itself willing to resist enormous executive pressure to keep the truth
hidden. But we cannot 'turn our backs on the very obvious fact
-that something staggering in scope and import happened. Watergate was not a minor event, certainly not a 'foolishness'. It remains in all its ramifications the most dangerous assault from
'within on the fundamentals of our democratic way that this nation
has yet experienced. And it has been justified, defended, and even
made possible by appealing to 'national security' and by use of elements of the 'national security' apparatus. Yet no one has given
a highly skeptical public an acceptable and persuasive reading of
just what the 'national security' threat fully consisted...
. .'National
'
security' can hardly justify -the tapping of the
telephone of a presidential speechwriter whose writ quite simply
did not extend to full access to sensitive foreign policy matters.
Nor does it excuse tapping former National Security Council aides
after they have left the White House and ,therefore are no longer
privy to matters of highest secrecy. Certainly it does not include
eavesdropping on lawyers concerned with domestic affairs in -the
White House, nor, one would hope, breaking into doctors' offices.
But this is just the trouble. Without any reasonable rules of
the game, accepted by all, any president and any administration
have a latitude for potential -mischief that is anything but healthy.
Faced with such imprecision, Congress has fallen down badly, and
largely acquiesced in the mystique of the 'national security' argument in fashion supine. (Emphasis added)
Much like the due process clauses of the Constitution, the term
defies definition. It cannot be encapsulated into a brief statement, a
clearly worded formula for now and the future. At best, what must
be done are attempts to grapple with the legitimacy and illegitimacy
of acts taken in the name of "national security." By pursuing the objective of developing a conceptual framework that will at once protect
legitimate executive requirements, meet with legislative approval,
stand up to judicial challenge, and, finally, win general public approval,
the Congress can move toward a workable definition.
The issue is urgent, one that necessitates the broadest possible national dialogue and debate. To that end, the Select Committee further
recommends:
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1. Continuing congressional hearings on the subject, by one or
more standing committees or subcommittees. A model for this might
be the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, chaired by Senator
Henry Jackson. The Joint Economic Committee could also serve as
a model.
2. Establishment by Congress of a national commission, both to
study the subject and also to interact with academic centers, policy institutes, and various public interest voluntary associations.
3. An examination of the "national security" role of Congress,
toward a more adversarial posture vis-a-vis the executive. Rather than
docilely following along when the executive speaks of national security,
Congress should assume the role of "devil's advocate" or at least of
a "loyal opposition," so that past, present, and proposed public policies
are given -themost searching scrutiny and analysis.
Recognizably, much of what travels under the banner of national
security also is considered to be secret. The propensity of the executive-of any bureaucracy-toward secrecy, even excessive secrecy, is
only too well-known. But that tendency, (which is the subject of
Recommendation No. 4 below) should not be permitted to stand in the
way of facing the urgent problem of defining the acceptable parameters
of the concept of national security, its use, and who under the American constitutional order should invoke it. The recommendations set
forth above will lead toward accomplishing that goal.
Recommendation No. 2
A joint congressional committee should be established to oversee the
activities of the intelligence and law-enforcement "community".
Discussion: It is a clear inference from testimony heard by the
Select Committee that the intelligence and law-enforcement "community" is not being adequately supervised-either by the executive
or, much more importantly, by the Congress. This situation is not a
new one. It has come before the Senate before. As long ago as 1966,
the Senate considered S.2815, introduced by Senator Young of Ohio,
a bill to establish a joint congressional committee "to make a continuing study and investigation of the activities and operations of the Central Intelligence Agency." (Cong. Rec., Jan. 24, 1966, p. 952, remarks of Sen. Young). That bill was followed by the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee's approval of a resolution in May, 1966, by Senator Fulbright of Arkansas, to create a Senate Committee on Intelligence Operations, That resolution was disapproved by the Senate in
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July, 1966. The conclusions and recommendations of the Committee
on Foreign Relations (as contained in Report No. 1371, 89th Congress,
2d Session, July 14, 1966) are apposite:
It should be emphasized that Senate Resolution 283 does not provide for an independent investigation of U.S. Government intelligence activities. On the contrary, its primary effect is to formalize
existing informal arrangements by -which some members of the
Committee on Armed Services and the Appropriations Committee
have been privy to Central Intelligence Agency activities and to
add to that group three members from the Committee on Foreign
Relations. A secondary effect is to provide the Senate with an instrument to deal -with the entire intelligence community-something which is not now done by Congress at all.
There is no need -to review here the publicized cases in which
the Central Intelligence Agency has been involved in recent years.
It has become apparent, however, that the Central Intelligence
Agency has engaged in many types of activities which were not
contemplated when it was created. These activities, in some -instances, have had serious implications -forU.S. foreign policy. And
yet, under existing practice, the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency has not felt he was authorized to give the Committee on
Foreign Relations information which it has felt was important in
the discharge of its duties in the field of foreign policy.
As a matter of principle, the Committee on Foreign Relations
'believes selected members should be in a position to receive information regarding Central Intelligence Agency activities -which -influence our foreign relations with other countries and -which could
mean the difference between war and peace. It seems appropriate, therefore, not only that the Senate's relationship to the Central
Intelligence Agency be formalized but that the Senate's Committee
on Foreign Relations have equal representation with the Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations in connection with
oversight of Central Intelligence Agency operations.
Senate Resolution 283 is designed to accomplish this purpose.
It is the most moderate proposal on this subject which has been
submitted to the Congress in recent years and one which should
be acceptable to -the Senate. It is not intended to reflect in any
way on any Members or committees of the Senate or on -the employees of the Central Intelligence Agency. Indeed, a formal committee of the type proposed should protect the CIA -from uninformed public criticism by providing a more formal arrangement
for Senate oversight. As is pointed out above, however, the primary purpose of -the resolution is to permit three members of the
Committee on Foreign Relations -to participate in -the deliberations
of the existing informal group and, hopefully, to contribute some
worthwhile suggestions regarding the activities and operations of
the intelligence community. -In the opinion of the 14 members of
the Committee on Foreign Relations who voted to report -this resolution, it is certainly not too much to ask-indeed, it is in the national interest that three members of that committee, which is
charged with the responsibility for advising the Senate on -foreign
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policy matters, have access to -the same information that is given
to certain members of the Committees on Appropriations and
Armed Services. Accordingly, it is recommended that the Senate
approve the pending resolution at an early date.
The Select Committee is aware also of Senate Report No. 93-466,
93rd Congress, 1st Session, Oct. 12, 1973, entitled "Questions Related
to Secret and Confidential Documents," rendered by the Special Committee to Study Questions Related to Secret and Confidential Government Documents. Although Report 93-466 deals with secrecy, which
is the subject of Recommendation No. 4, below, the last three paragraphs of its recommendations are relevant (p. 16 of the report):
III. At the request of Senator Cranston, the Committee discussed
providing the Senate the overall sums requested for each separate
intelligence agency. The release of such sums would provide members with the minimal information they should have about our intelligence operations. Such information would also end ,the practice of inflating certain budget figures so as to hide intelligence
costs, and would insure that all members will know the true cost
of each budget item they must vote upon.
Accordingly, -the Committee recommends that the Appropriations Committee itemize in the Defense Department Appropriations bill the -total sums proposed to be appropriated for intelligence
activities by each of the following agencies: Central Intelligence
Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency,
National Reconnaissance Office and any separate intelligence units
within the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The Committee does not
request that any line items be revealed.
The Committee also recommends -that the committee reports
indicate the total number of personnel to 'be employed by each of
the above agencies. The Committee does not request any information about their duties.
Of particular importance is the fact that, to the knowledge of this
Select Committee, the reference to the National Reconnaissance Office
is the only public acknowledgment of such an organization. It is manifest that the Congress generally, and the public not at all, does not have
adequate knowledge of the funding or even of the existence of certain
intelligence agencies. For example, there appears to be no evaluation
of the duties or responsibilities of the Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board within 'the executive offices of the president and of the board's
relationship to the CIA and other intelligence agencies.
It is clear beyond peradventure, accordingly, that steps must be
taken by the Congress to insure that adequate oversight of segments
of the intelligence community is accomplished. Of particular importance, in the light of testimony by E. Howard Hunt and by officers of
the CIA, is the extent to which the CIA is, or should be, authorized
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to take action to protect the sources and methods of collection of intelligence data. The joint committee, if established, should inquire into
the extent to which that responsibility of the CIA conflicts with the statutory mandate that it undertake no domestic security functions.
The Select Committee recognizes the extraordinary importance
and delicacy of both intelligence and law enforcement functions of government, but believes that a joint committee modeled on the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy (which also is concerned with data of
the highest importance) would go far toward rectifying what may well
be an uncontrolled intelligence function of government. As for law
enforcement, testimony of the former acting director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, Patrick Gray, as well as other information
publicly known, indicates that similar oversight functions should be performed over the FBI and similar agencies. The joint committee, if established, could include that as one of its primary objectives.
Recommendation No. 3
An office of "congressional counsel" should be established to provide
legal advice and advocacy for Congress, its committees and subcommittees, and individual members of Congress acting in their afficial capacity.
Further, jurisdictional statutes should be amended so as to enable suits
by Congress and/or its membership and committees, without regard to
problems of "jurisdictional amount" and other requirements for other
litigants.
Discussion: During recent years a number of controversies between Congress and the executive have made it manifest -thatCongress
needs a permanent legal staff to protect its interests in the courts and
administrative tribunals. Included -are the following issues: the pocket
veto power of the president, impoundment by the president of appropriated funds, executive privilege, and suits against Congress or its
members (for example, Powell v. McCormack and United States v.
Gravel). During the hearings of the Select Committee, the problem
became particularly acute when lawyers on the staff of the committee
had to be diverted from investigative duties to litigate the committee's
case against the president for the production of subpoenaed tape recordings. In addition, the committee, under a ruling by Judge John
Sirica, found that it did not come within the jurisdictional provisions
of the United States Code in its suit against the president. This necessitated passage of an extraordinary, one time (for the Select Committee) statute permitting the district courts of the District of Columbia
to assume jurisdiction in such litigation.
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It has, accordingly, become quite clear that Congress cannot rely
upon the Department of Justice to protect its valid interests in the
courts and administrative tribunals. Nor does Congress now have the
requisite staff facilities. What is needed within the legislative branch
is an office, modeled perhaps on the office of the solicitor general,
manned by top flight lawyers who would both augment the existing
services of -the Congressional Research Service and serve as a "lawyer
for Congress." In this connection, the committee notes the introduction of S. 2615 by Senator Vance Hartke in October, 1973, and approves it in principle. The Select Committe, in addition, adopts the
thrust and tenor of the remarks of Senator Hartke made when he introduced S. 2615 (see Congressional Record, Friday, October 26,
1973, pp. S. 19489-92), without necessarily subscribing to every statement made therein.
Finally, so as to obviate any possibility of Congress, any of its committees or subcommittees, or its members being denied access to the
federal courts because of jurisdictional or other procedural grounds, the
Select Committee believes it is necessary to enact into permanent legislation the bill (Public Law 93-190) under which the district courts in
the District of Columbia were permitted to hear the committee's suit
for presidential tape recordings.
Recommendation No. 4
The nature and extent of "executive privilege" should be carefully defined and circumscribed by statute. Further, steps should be taken to
eliminate employment or other techniques of nondisclosure of information by the executive branch.
Discussion: "Executive privilege" as a technique of nondisclosure
by the executive after congressional requests for data has been thoroughly studied in recent years by the Subcommittee on Separation of
Powers of the Senate's Committee on the Judiciary and by 'an Ad Hoc
Committee of the Senate's Government Operations Committee. There
is no present need to repeat what has been said there, nor to repeat
the conclusions of the Report of the Subcommittee on Separation of
Powers. Suffice it to say that the Select Committee, having experienced repeated refusals by the president both to testify before the committee and to produce relevant documents and other evidence, considers it vitally necessary that legislation be enacted that will carefully
delimit the nature and extent of the exercise of executive privilege.
The committee believes that the privilege is available only to the president and only as to communications with and by him to his personal

Wimter 1975]

COMMENTARY-ARTHUR SELWYN MILLER

advisors and by his personal advisors among -themselves. Further, it
believes that the privilege is available only with respect to the official
duties of the chief executive. It therefore recommends that legislation
be enacted to limit the use of executive privilege in those respects.
That legislation, when promulgated, would not impinge upon the
necessary confidentiality of the office of the presidency. It would preserve secrecy when secrecy is required. That can only be in the conduct of official business. Further, it would make it impossible, by requiring the president to invoke the privilege personally, for all save a
few high officials within the executive branch to utilize it.
The committee is also aware, from a study made by the Senate's
Separation of Powers Subcommittee, that numerous other techniques
are employed by the executive so as to deny necessary and relevant
information to Congress and, at times, to prevent appearance of witnesses. The net conclusion of this study, to be published as a committee print, is that executive privilege is not merely one of the executive's
techniques of avoiding providing information to Congress-it is one of
the least used. Many other devices effectively isolate Congress from
data and witnesses to which it is entitled. The time is long past for
legislation to be enacted -that will eliminate all types of nondisclosure
of information requested by Congress from the executive.
Recommendation No. 5
Immediate steps should be taken by Congress to improve its institutional
capability to obtain, store, assimilate, retrieve, and use complex data
on public policy issues from diverse sources.

Discussion: A major reason for the flow of governmental power
toward the executive is the inability of Congress, both collectively and
individually, to deal effectively with large amounts of data covering the
entire spectrum of public policy issues with which it deals. An imbalance in institutional capabilities vis-a-vis the executive is only too
apparent. Congress does not have the requisite physical plant, manpower, professional staff, services, and overall resources to enable it
to operate in an increasingly complex governmental environment.
These deficiencies relate directly to the Watergate events, particularly to the failure of Congress adequately to oversee the public administration (or to establish other organizations to do so). Future Watergates may be impossible either to foresee or to prevent, but surely it
is accurate to maintain that the risk of another concatenation of circumstance like Watergate would be substantially reduced if Congress became physically and structurally more able to perform the day-to-day
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oversight of the public administration, including the executive offices
of the presidency, that is so necessary. Rep. Richard Bolling, chairman of the House Select Committee on Committees, aptly stated in
February, 1974:
If there is a lesson in Watergate, it is not that we had a President
who was either blind or willful-but that there was nobody watching. We cannot have a system which depends on a benign executive-or a malign one. We've got to make the Congress work;
there is no alternative. And if the Congress cannot be responsible,
then the whole system of representative government and free
choice government is going down the drain.
The basic problem facing Congress in this respect is less that of the
members wanting to monitor the executive branch than it is of their
ability to do so. Without resources necessary for the task, it becomes
impossible-a futile gesture, a mere charade, an empty shell.
That the Congress has the constitutional power to effect such
oversight cannot be doubted. Three basic means are employed: legislative, investigative, and financial. In each activity, there are manifest
shortcomings in numbers of staff and adequacy of plant. All of this
is a -thrice told tale, requiring no present restatement. It is enough to
note that the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress, the General Accounting Office, and the professional staffs of the
committees and subcommittees, all of which perform valuable services,
are not in and of themselves sufficient ,to the need. Congress must
reform itself so as to live in the last part of the twentieth century. As
matters now stand, it resembles more a nineteenth century institution
than one attuned to the needs of the modem -age and the emergent
future. A vehicle for modernizing Congress may be found in the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, which established the Joint Committee on Congressional Operations with the duty to:
make a continuing study of Congressional organization and operation; and to recommend improvements designed to strengthen Congress, simplify its operations, -improve its relationships with other
branches of the United States Government, and enable it better to
meet responsibilities under the Constitution.
Among the irreducible needs for modernizing Congress are the
following:
1. Widespread use of computer technology. In this connection,
it is noteworthy that the Select Committee scored a technological
breakthrough by being the first congressional committee to use a computer to store data. Testimony that use of a computer and microfilm
storage bank could serve Congress in other activities came from a num-

Winter 1975]

COMMENTARY-ARTHUR SELWYN MILLER

61

ber of sources. For example, Senator J.W. Fulbright stated in a letter
to the chairman:
I hope you will consider, in addition to the important substantive
issues with which you are concerned, including a section (in the
Select Committee's report) on methodology-specifically, the manner in which the Committee handled the masses of data which it
accumulated in the course of its investigation.
I raise this point because I am increasingly impressed with the difficulties which Congress faces in -this respect, particularly as compared to the enormous capabilities of -the executive branch. The
problem is steadily ,becoming more serious in the Foreign Relations
Committee.
You must have faced the same problem in the Select Committee.
Judging from the efficient manner in which the Committee organized and presented voluminous data, you must have solved the
problem.
In another letter to the chairman, Senator Frank Church stated:
Let me cite only three examples from the experience of the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations. Last year the subcommittee sent a detailed questionnaire to -more than 50 of the largest
corporations seeking information on international currency -transactions, a subject of prime importance with respect to which there
is little or no information. We have not yet been able 'to compile
the results of that Questionnaire and finally had to resort to a con-tractwith a private firm.
The subcommittee has also distributed a questionnaire to an even
larger number of corporations seeking data on operations and investment decisions in Latin America. We are having to rely on
the good offices of a university in order to analyze the replies.
Finally, the subcommittee's recent hearings on international oil
companies involved the laborious sorting through of something
more 'than 30 file drawers of documentation. It is a tribute to the
subcommittee's staff that -this was done as well as it was, but it took
a great many man-hours and I am still not sure that something was
not overlooked ....
In short, the subcommittee's inquiry would have been greatly facilitated if the subcommittee had modern techniques at its disposal.
Obviously, the Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities did have such techniques at its disposal or it could not have
handled such masses of data as efficently as it did.
I hope that in preparing your report you will consider making recommendations as to how . . . Congress as a whole might better
equip itself to deal with a problem of growing importance. It is
a problem which must be solved if Congress is to face the executive
branch and the private sector on anything like an equal footing.
The Select Committee recommends that the Joint Committee on Congressional Operations urgently consider the effective use of computer
technology.
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2. More professional staff. There can be little dispute over the
need for more highly trained professionals to augment the staffs of
congressional committees and subcommittees. The Congress should
not hesitate to appropriate such funds as are necessary for this. Included should be lawyers and economists, as well as other social and
behavioral scientists, plus those with expertise in science and technology.
3. Use of professional staff as "legislative hearing examiners" to
conduct much, but not all, of the hearings of the several committees
and subcommittees. The need for this flows from the obvious fact that
a single member of Congress is expected to be knowledgeable on matters covering the entire executive branch (as well as outside of it).
Equally obviously, no single senator or representative can become expert in all aspects of the matters on which he must vote-or even on
those which the committees of which he is a member considers. A
corps of highly professional "legislative hearing examiners" would go
far toward rectifying imbalances in expertise between Congress and the
executive.
4. An "institute" for Congress. In addition to the foregoing, a
need exists for Congress to have a permanent outside source on which
it can draw for objective analyses of major public issues, review of
proposals advocated by the executive, and that, further, would suggest problems to which the Congress should be attentive and publish
studies -thatwould be available to the entire Congress. In short, a congressional "think tank" is required. The Select Committee recommends that its establishmentbe made a matter of first priority.
Recommendation No. 6
Legislation should be enacted requiring all "wiretaps" and other electronic surveillance, to have prior judicial approval.
Discussion: During the Select Committee's hearings, it became
manifest, particularly during the testimony of such White House officers as John Ehrlichman, that a theory of inherent presidential powers
was being employed to accomplish a number of objectives of the most
dubious legality. Often, as with the burglary of Dr. Fielding's office,
they were obviously illegal. Colloquy between the Select Committed's
Chairman and Mr. John Wilson, attorney for Mr. Ehrlichman, revealed
that reliance was being placed upon United States v. United States District Court, 407 U. S. 297 (1972) (the "wiretap case"), as a source of
presidential power. It is, of course, clear beyond peradventure that
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the Court in -that decision firmly rejected the government's claim that
warrantless electronic searches in domestic security cases were a reasonable exercise of presidential power. Justice Lewis Powell's, opinion
for a unanimous Supreme Court concluded that "prior judicial approval
is required" for domestic security surveillance. The issue arose in a
case in which the attorney general had authorized wiretaps "to gather
intelligence information deemed necessary to protect the nation from
attempts of domestic organizations to attack and subvert the existing
structure of the government."
The Court said that although the Fourth Amendment's requirement of a warrant before a search is not an absolute, the prior judgment
of an independent magistrate is the norm. "Fourth Amendment freedoms cannot be properly guaranteed if domestic security surveillances
may be conducted solely within the discretion of the executive branch."
Although Justice Powell carefully limited his opinion to "the domestic
aspects of national security" and expressed no opinion on "the issues
which may be involved with respect to activities of foreign powers or
their agents," he did state (with respect to the issue of domestic security): "Nor do we believe prior judicial approval will fracture the
secrecy essential to official intelligence gathering. . . . Judges may be
counted upon to be especially conscious of security requirements in national security cases." (Emphasis added). (But see Laird v. Tatum,
408 U. S. 1 (1972), in which the Supreme Court, 5-4, failed to find
a "justiciable" controversy so as to permit a decision on the merits of
the Army's surveillance of civilian political activity.)
From the fact that the Court left unanswered the question of
whether warrants are necessary with respect to foreign intelligence and
in light of Laird v. Tatum, it is clear that Congress should address itself
to the question of whether prior judicial approval should be required
for all wiretaps and other electronic surveillance, as well as for other
types of surveillance. The Select Committee so recommends. In the
wiretap case, supra, Justice Powell suggested that "Congress may wish
to consider protective standards (for foreign intelligence wiretaps)
which differ from those already prescribed for specified crimes in Title
III (of the 1968 Crime Control Act). Different standards may be
compatible with the Fourth Amendment if they are reasonable both
in relation to the legitimate need of government for intelligence information and the protected rights of our citizens."
The Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue of foreign intelligence not involving American citizens. At least two courts of appeals,
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however, have held that such surveillance does not violate the Fourth
Amendment. See United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418 (5th Cir.
1973); United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1972).
There is no reason to prohibit the executive from conducting such surveillance. Since, however, American citizens may at times be (inadvertently) involved, there seems to be no valid reason why a warrant
should not be obtained prior to the wiretap. Congress should take cognizance of Justice Powell's invitation in the wiretap case and address
itself to the question.
Legislation should establish procedures permitting the courts under designated standards to authorize surveillance of foreign powers.
The basic standard that could be employed is whether there is reason
to believe that information of importance to the nation's security would
be obtained.
To obviate possible disclosure of such activities, Congress could
establish special procedures to be followed. This could be done easily
and effectively by a provision that all such warrants be issued by a
single judge-perhaps the chief judge of the United States district
courts in the District of Columbia. Staff work could be performed by
the Department of Justice, so that only the judge himself need see the
material and the warrant. And special procedures should be established to protect the rights of American citizens who might be overheard. In net, the need is for prior judicial approval under guidelines
that will protect nationalsecurity.
There is no constitutional barrier to such legislation. The ultimate power under the Constitution is that of Congress; see Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 (1952). As Justice
White said in his concurring opinion in the wiretap case, "the United
States does not claim that Congress is powerless to require warrants
for surveillance which the President otherwise would not be barred by
the Fourth Amendment from undertaking without a warrant." The
wiretap case is -a direct holding by the Supreme Court that Congress
can limit the executive's power to tap without a warrant. In a footnote
-to Justice White's opinion, he indicates that 'the Justice Department,
speaking through Assistant Attorney General Robert Mardian, accepted the view that Congress did have such power.
The changes in existing law recommended by the Select Committee could be accomplished by two steps: (a) striking section 2511(3)
of the Omnibus Crime Bill, thus making all warrantless national security
wiretaps illegal; and (b) drafting a new section establishing procedures
for taps on foreign powers and foreign nationals in their employ. The
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further recommendation of the Select Committee is for legislation to
"reverse" the Court's decision in Laird v. Tatum, the Army surveillance
case.
Recommendation No. 7
Legislation should be enacted that all presidential rules whether by
proclamation, executive order, or any other label, be submitted to the
Congress for its scrutiny before going into effect. Further, that no such
rule shall become effective unless approved by both houses of Congress
by affirmative votes.
Discussion: It is impossible to determine how many executive
orders and proclamations, having the effect of law, have been issued
since the beginnings of the republic. The first attempt to systematize
the process of executive lawmaking came in 1907, when a numbering
system was established. That chaotic situation was bad enough when
the federal government had relatively few tasks to perform-in, that
is, the pre-1933 era. Beginning in 1933, however, the bureaucracy
greatly expanded and the number of executive orders took an exponential leap. As the Senates Special Committee on Termination of the
National Emergency put it in early 1974, ". . .the National Recovery
Administration (in two years) disseminated its regulations in the form
of 5991 press releases constituting in all over 10,000 pages of 'law.'"
The situation became intolerable, leading Congress in 1935 to
pass the Federal Register Act. This statute requires publication in the
Federal Register of all executive orders and proclamations, as well as
other documents. But the act did not specify which executive directives
had to be issued as executive orders or proclamations. Furthermore, -there was no requirement that international executive agreements, whether entered into pursuant to a preexisting statute or treaty
or pursuant to pure presidential authority, be published. It was not
until 1972 that Congress enacted a statute requiring that it be informed
of all such agreements.
It is evident that the manner in which executive orders and proclamations are issued is still in a chaotic state. This permits, as the Senate
Special Committee on Termination of the National Emergency said,
excessive discretion in presidential lawmaking. Said the committee:
If the format and procedures for issuing Executive Orders and
proclamations appear inadequate and inconsistent, the situation regarding other Executive directives is even more so, bordering on
the chaotic. Title 3 of the Code of Federal Regulations indicates
that in issuing decisions and commands, Presidents have used such
diverse forms as letters, memorandums, directives, notices, reorganization plans, administrative designation,' and military orders.
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The decision whether to publish an Executive decision is clearly a
result of the President's own discretion rather than any prescription
of law. In recent years, the National Security Action Memorandums of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson and the National Security Action Directives of President Nixon represent a new method
for promulgating decisions, in areas of the gravest importance.
Such decisions are not specifically required by law to be published
in any register, even in a classified form; none have prescribed formats or procedures; none of these vital Executive decisions are revealed to Congress or the public except under irregular, arbitrary
or accidental circumstances. For instance, the secret bombing of
Cambodia has recently come before congressional and public notice. The public record reveals very little about how the commands for such far reaching actions were issued. What is most
disturbing is the lack of access -to any authoritative records in these
matters. In short, there is no formal accountability for the most
crucial Executive decisions affecting the lives of citizens and the
freedom of individuals and institutions.
The problem is exacerbated by the classification of sensitive
or important Executive decisions, classification which in most cases
prevents even Congress from having access to these documents.
While no one would wish to prevent sensitive documents from being classified -forreasonable cause, the absolute discretion given to
the Executive in -this area has led to abuse. It has permitted and
encouraged inclusion in this category of many documents in no way
connected with essential national security. Moreover, not only are
their contents kept secret, but even the extent of such documents
is unascertainable. On the basis of the handling of past Presidential papers, many of these documents will, of course, in one manner
or another, eventually be declassified, but many have been withheld by Executive discretion.
,Until recently, classified Executive Orders were inserted
chronologically in the prescribed serialization of the FederalRegister by the use of a letter suffix after the number of the last preceding order, for example, Executive Order 7784-A. It seems evident
that even this provision for recording classified Executive directives
has, by and large, not been used because other less public forms
of Executive directives have proven more convenient.
The legal record of executive decisionmaking has thus continued to be closed from the light of public or congressional scrutiny
-through the use of classified procedures which withhold necessary
documents from Congress by failure to establish substantive criteria
for publication and by bypassing existing standards. As a result,
the legality of a substantial area of operations of the Government
has in large measure been immune from any oversight or scrutiny
by Congress. And the situation is growing worse. The number
of formal Executive Orders and Proclamations has, in recent years,
declined from many hundreds to about 70 annually. Since it is
certain that as the United States has grown in size and power that
the Executive is issuing more and more decisions, many of which
are of the greatest importance, it can only be surmised that such
commands continue to be issued in irregularform and in ways un-

Winter 1975]

COMMENTARY-ARTHUR SELWYN MILLER

67

accountable to Congress and the people. As the role of the Executive in Government continues to expand, this must be cause for
the greatest concern. (Emphasis added)
This matter is exacerbated because the president, at his own discretion and without any congressional oversight, has assumed the
power to declare -that a state of national emergency exists. (The nation, for example, has been under a state of presidentially declared national emergency since 1950.) There are more than 470 statutes permitting the president to exercise emergency powers. These statutes,
almost without exception, provide no standards at all to limit presidential authority. Nor is there any requirement that the state of emergency be of limited duration. Says the Special Committee:
Thus, whenever the President so decides, he may legitimately
establish a Government rule not subject to many normal congressional checks. The Constitution and especially the Bill of Rights
still provide significant restraints, but the institutional checks designed to protect the guarantees of the Constitution and Bill of
Rights are significantly weakened by the growing tendency to give
the President the grants of extraordinary power without provision
for effective congressional oversight, or without any limitation upon
the duration such awesome powers may be used.
The conclusion is unavoidable that steps must be taken to curb
presidential lawmaking. To that end, the Select Committee recommends enactment of a statute that will require the submission of every
presidential order or directive, by whatever name called, to be submitted to the Congress prior to its promulgation. The Select Committee further recommends that no such order or directive be allowed to
have the effect of law until both houses of Congress approve it by
majority vote. Inasmuch as there may well be hundreds or even thousands of such orders and directives promulgated in a given year, Congress could establish a means by which some office-for example the
General Accounting Office or, if established, the Office of Congressional Counsel (see Recommendation No. 3 above)-could be delegated the responsibility for receiving and approving the routine orders
and directives. Congress could ,then devote itself to consideration of
only those of the greatest importance or impact.
Recommendation No. 8
Congress should undertake an immediate, comprehensive analysis and
examination of the executive offices of the presidency in order to determine whether its organization fulfills basic constitutional principles.
Discussion: A clear inference to be drawn from the volumes of
testimony heard by the Select Committee, as well as additional evi-
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dence available, indicates that the institutionalized office of the presidency has swollen to mammoth proportions. A structure which as recently as President Franklin D. Roosevelt was designed to provide the
president with staff assistance and advice has been gradually transformed into an instrument of control. More and more the executive
branch of government is hierarchically organized, with controls in increasing degree over the departments and agencies (and even, at
times, over the so-called independent regulatory commissions). Power
is being centralized in the White House and its immediate environs to
an extent unknown in history. As Bryce N. Harlow, an assistant to
President Nixon, once said, "Richard Nixon is running the whole government from the White House." (Quoted from HuGHES, Tim LrviNG
PRESIDENcY

344 (1973).)

Personal advisers have been converted from presidential assistants
to assistant presidents, who govern without any external controls on
their actions. They are accountable to no one and are elected by no
one; the Senate does not confirm them, their actions are not judicially
reviewable, they invoke "executive privilege" and otherwise refuse to
deal with Congress-they in short act as a "government within a government." As -assistant presidents, they exercise enormous powertaken in the name of the president but often, it seems, without his
acquiescence or even his knowledge. In 1939, when the executive offices of the presidency were created, it was emphasized that the assistants to the president "would not be assistant presidents in any sense"
and "would remain in the background, issue no orders, make no decisions, emit no public statements." President Roosevelt's Executive
Order 8248, issued September 8, 1939, which is still in effect, states
in part: "In no event shall the administrative assistants be interposed
between the President and the head of any department or agency or
any one of the divisions in the Executive Office of the President."
How far the nation has strayed from that principle was starkly
revealed in the testimony of such witnesses as H. R. Haldeman, John
Ehrlichman, John Dean, L. Patrick Gray, and General Vernon Waiters.
The Select Committee recognizes the need for an adequate presidential
staff, but believes that its basic structure and philosophy must be restudied by Congress to determine the extent to which basic constitutional and statutory principles are 'being fulfilled. At the very least,
the concept of "assistant presidents"-a situation which, the committee
notes, antedated the Nixon -administration-must be thoroughly examined. For too long, to cite one example, effective control over the
conduct of foreign relations rested with close advisers to Presidents
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Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon-at the expense of the Department of
State, the cabinet department established by Congress to conduct foreign affairs. Furthermore, the committee believes that the principle
of Executive Order 8248, set forth above, should be enacted into statute. If that is done, assistants to the president would soon cease to
be assistant presidents-but they would not be precluded from carrying
out necessary liaison activities.
Since the Select Committee had neither the time nor the resources
to accomplish the necessary in-depth study of the executive offices of
the presidency, it is limiting its recommendation to pointing out the
urgent necessity of immediate congressional action to do that task and
to make appropriate legislative recommendations. The study can be
done either by Congress itself or, perhaps more appropriately, by a
special study commission with carefully defined duties and responsibilities.
Recommendation No. 9
Legislation should be enacted, similar to the "conflict of interest" laws,
under which no executive officer may become an officer of the national
committee of any political party or of any organization established to
further the reelection of the president.
Discussion: Little discussion is necessary to demonstrate the need
for legislation such as this. The former attorney general, John N.
Mitchell, moved directly from that office to head the Committee to Reelect the President. In so doing, he could not have avoided taking with
him the trappings, and much of the power and influence, of the attorney general's office. His relations with former colleagues in the Department of Justice made it obvious that the appearance of justice, in
the activities of the department, was seriously jeopardized. The same,
in a somewhat different way, may be said for Maurice Stans, who
moved from secretary of commerce to head of the Finance Committee
to Re-elect the President.
Conflict of interest statutes now in the United States Code prevent
a government employee, civilian or military, from using the knowledge
that he gained while in government for a certain period after leaving
the government. The same principle should be invoked with respect
to high government officials becoming officers in political campaigns.
A two-year waiting period would seem to be reasonable.
Furthermore, the question of the use of employees within the
executive offices of the presidency-for example, Charles Colson, devoting their time to reelecting the president, while on the government

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 2

payroll, raises serious questions of propriety. If public financing of
election campaigns is not recommended by the Select Committee, then
it must, if it is to be consistent, also recommend legislation prohibiting
any member of the federal government, other than the president and
vice-president, from devoting any on-the-job time to election matters.
The committee notes the pending lawsuit, Public Citizen v. Schultz on
the question, of whether the salaries of E.O.P. employees were validly
paid to those who worked on the election campaign of President Nixon.
Whatever the outcome of that litigation, it is manifest that the principle
or spirit of the Hatch Act should be applied to all government employees other than the president and vice-president.
Recommendation No. 10
Recommendations for legislative action made in this report should be
periodically monitored by both houses of Congress until such time as
they all have been thoroughly considered.
Discussion: The report of the Select Committee is lengthy. It
contains many recommendations. Most of these require more study,
particularly as to their details, before they can be put into effect. The
committee proffers the recommendations in the expectation that the
appropriate committees of both houses of Congress will place them on
their agenda for early study and for congressional action as soon as
possible. Continuing monitoring is considered necessary in order that
the specific recommendations will, as soon 'as practicable, receive the
careful attention of the Congress. None of the foregoing recommendations requires a constitutional amendment; all can be put into effect
by statute. That makes the task immeasurably easier.
Conclusion
This part of the committee's report has been devoted to "systemic" recommendations-those that touch and concern some of the
larger implications of Watergate. The essential problem in 1974 is the
same as it was in 1787, when -the Constitution was drafted: How to
cabin the exercise of governmental power (to make it "accountable")
while at the same time permitting the urgent tasks of government to
be accomplished. Because of the many additional tasks and responsibilities of government (noted above), this problem has become even
more difficult than in the past to assess and resolve.
It is manifest that the imbalance of power that has developed by
slow accretion over the decades must be readjusted. There can be no
question about the need for strong leadership by the executive branch;
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but equally, there can be no question that Congress should -take a number of steps immediately to effect that readjustment. The recommendations listed in this chapter are not necessarily complete. Quite possibly, others will become apparent, particularly if the relevant committees of both houses of Congress address themselves to scrutinizing the
recommendations herein with care and dispatch.
Little time-not nearly enough time-is available for that effort.
But it must be made, and soon, else presidential government will be
here to stay-both in fact (as it is now) and in theory. Constitutions
are not static documents; they are living instruments of government.
As Woodrow Wilson put it, they follow Darwinian rather than Newtonian principles. American government-the constitutional order itself
-has been basically altered in -the less than two centuries since 1787
-by amendment, by Supreme Court interpretation, by congressional
action, and by custom and usage. We delude ourselves if we believe
that the principles enunciated by the founding fathers do not change
in content through time.
Those changes are readily apparent in -the rise of executive hegemony in the federal government, a process that has found -the Congress,
speaking generally, a ready ally. It is time now to stop that development, to turn it aside by reasserting the legislative prerogative in those
situations where it should be exercised-and simultaneously permitting
the president to exercise necessary leadership.
A reevaluation of the constitutional order would, ideally, be accomplished -through means of a constitutional convention. That, however, is neither desirable nor feasible. Happily, the same results cani
be reached if Congress, acting as a collegial body, would take the minimum steps listed above to modernize itself and to become, once again,
a coequal partner engaged in awesome -task of governing -the most
powerful nation in the world's history.
Appendix
If the tortuous activities of the Committee on the Judiciary of the
House of Representatives prove anything, it is that the constitutional
remedy of impeachment is ill-suited to the exigencies of modem -times.
The time is long past for the American people -to face up to the question of constitutional amendment to provide for the removal of presidents from office.
In this century alone, at least four, -and perhaps six or even seven,
chief executives should have left office before the ends of -their terms:
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Four completely lost the confidence of the people: Herbert Hoover,
Harry Truman, Lyndon Johnson, and (as this is written) Richard
Nixon. Woodrow Wilson was physically incompetent during the last
several months of this second term; and Warren Harding completely
lacked competence. The possible seventh is Dwight Eisenhower, after
his two illnesses.
That is a bad record for any office, let alone that of the single
most powerful human being in the world. The clear inference is that
some way other than impeachment is a prime requirement for good
government in this age. Can we any longer engage in the slow, cumbersome, divisive and traumatic process of impeachment? Hardly.
The world moves on with accelerating speed, and all the while we indulge ourselves in ancient constitutional procedures. Impeachment is
an eighteenth-century minuet, a slow and stately exercise that is out
of place in the mad pace of the last part of the twentieth century.
Resignation, of course, is possible, as is the halfway-house of temporary disability (under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment). But neither
process fits the need. The former is wholly voluntary; -the latter both
voluntary and mandatory. But who, when the mandatory provisions
of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment are invoked, will bell the cat?
The search for a feasible alternative must acknowledge at the outset that this country, as are all major governments today, is dominated
by the executive. Americans have presidential government in fact,
whatever the Constitution says or implies or whatever the Supreme
Court or Congress has said. The problem is not to eliminate presidential leadership, but to cabin it-to make it accountable. Needed, in
other words, is a means by which necessary political power can be kept
within reasonable boundaries.
Separation of powers, the answer of the founding fathers to that
problem, no longer suffices. The Congress cannot and, indeed, it will
not govern. It has, quite happily and willingly, acquiesced in the process by which power has flowed to the presidency. The net result is
an office that puts far too much power in one person. No other major
nation in the world, not even totalitarian nations such as the USSR, so
concentrate political power.
Barbara Tuchman has suggested pluralizing the presidency into
six different executives. But that is hardly feasible or desirable. If
adopted, -the necessary leadership of a single chief executive would be
lost. Michael Novak, quite properly in my judgment, has called atten-
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tion to the problems that arise when, as in the American Constitution,
one person is both head of state and head of government. That should
be changed, but will not be (within the,foreseeable future).
A better solution has been proposed by Rep. Henry Reuss (D.
Wis.). In February, 1974, he introduced a resolution (H.J. Res. 903)
calling for an amendment to establish a "no confidence" vote on the
president alone. If three-fifths of each house votes no confidence then
the president would step down and the vice-president would act as chief
executive until a special election was held.
Difficulties of course are present in the Reuss proposal. One involves the lack of identified standards by which no-confidence votes
could be held. Certainly such a vote could not come on every bill considered by Congress. However, those standards could presumably be
worked out in congressional hearings on the resolution, accompanied
by public debate. No thoughtful person would wish for a president
to leave office for blindly partisan or trivial reasons.
Mr. Reuss limits his resolution to the president alone, justifying
the failure to encompass a true parliamentary system by saying that
members of Congress must face such a vote every two years (for the
House of Representatives, plus one-third of the Senate). That may
well be a weakness; but on the other hand, it may be a means for the
proposal -toget serious consideration in Congress.
Those who might say that the Reuss proposal would result in a
weakened presidency fail to note that it has been fifty years since Great
Britain removed a prime minister from office on a vote of no confidence. The fact that President Nixon, -at the nadir of his power, has
prevailed in all except one of his recent vetoes (those since Watergate), is ample testimony -tothe great power of the office.
The merits in the Reuss proposal are obvious. There would be
no trauma of impeachment. A president could be removed from office
without having to define an "impeachable offense". And presidents
who have in fact lost the confidence of the electorate would no longer
be in office; as said above, this country has a bad track record in this
century on its chief executives. Further, adoption of the Reuss proposal should result in at least a partial resurrection of congressional
powers, without making this a government by legislature. Congress
would, in all probability, be forced to reorganize itself.
Impeachment, which for the British in the Middle Ages was the
chief institution for the preservation of the government, has degenerated in the United States into a seldom-used blunderbuss. It is not

74

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 2

an instrument to effect badly needed accountability upon those who
govern us. To adopt the Reuss proposal is not to tinker with the Constitution, but to improve it. A vote of no-confidence is no panacea;
it would merely be an improvement.

